
Earlier this year, I sat down to reflect on the trial of FlexMyRent
with Damon Gibbons, Chief Executive at the Centre for Responsible Credit:
Matthew: What is your key takeaway from the pilot?
Damon: That the theory underpinning the scheme – that providing flexibility with bills can be an effective alternative to credit use – is correct but that it is difficult to implement – that is the key learning. Offering people flexibility and promising a more constructive kind of relationship is hard work, and it has to be backed up across the organisation.
When onboarding onto the platform, residents were asked questions about their financial circumstances. These were used to inform the decision about whether to accept or defer their proposal. Those whose proposals were deferred should have been offered financial advice or support – the platform was conceived as both an enabler to residents, as well as a way of helping housing associations identify people in financial difficulties before these became too embedded.
If you ask questions about a person’s financial situation, people will tell you their problems. But if you are not set up to support them, there might be difficulties. What is critical is that there has to be organisational buy-in to schemes like these – and this can be difficult in large organisations that have been set up from a transactional perspective.
M: Those closest to the project were definitely champions of the scheme.
D: Yes, but we didn’t do enough to win people over beyond those in the project group. We lacked the regular communication with the right teams to gain valuable feedback and address concerns.
Originally, we envisaged the training for income officers as being delivered face-to-face. It had to be delivered online because of the pandemic and thus it became more of a tick box exercise, rather than a communal, cultural mindshift. The online nature meant we could not gauge how well officers really understood the training. Ensuring all income officers involved are aligned on the approach and committed to the pilot would have had a bigger impact.
This meant many applications were deferred, when they could – in our view – have been accepted, and the link for people who were turned down to other forms of support wasn’t as effective as it could have been in many cases. At the end of the pilot there was a perception amongst some Income Officers that FlexMy Rent was a hindrance to their work, rather than being seen as a benefit to residents.
Looking back, we should have done more to try and communicate with Income Officers within the organisation about the benefits of FlexMy Rent. We should have had more regular feedback about what people thought of it, how important it was for residents and how it was benefitting them. At the time, however, we were focused on developing the platform by improving the user experience, making it easier for people to create and submit plans etc, and improving its risk assessment processes in the light of the data that was coming through. We under-estimated the amount of work it would take, and the communication with Income teams suffered as a result.
M: What other issues did the pilot face?
D: There were organisational pressures with both partners. One was going through a merger, which was playing out in the background. The other had issue with internal conflicting demands on their IT team, as well as one of the key sponsors of the pilot leaving the organisation. This isn’t to attribute blame – it is just what happens within housing associations.
Another issue was how we were able to market the offer to residents. All we were able to do was cold marketing to residents, with the housing associations sending people an email or text message saying they were invited to participate and referring them to the platform. Most of those went unopened or ignored. Two thirds of e-mails from housing associations weren’t opened. This impacted the number of residents joining the scheme. To give it more chance of succeeding, there needs to be broad based marketing about what the offer was, how flexibility is important, how they support the offer to residents.
Finally, the impact of rent increases had a detrimental impact on residents but also resulted in the need for further platform technical development that hadn’t been anticipated.
M: What about the positives from the pilot?
D: From the resident’s perspective, most of them liked it, appreciated it, found it helpful, helped them manage cost-of-living pressures. Most of the agreements were successful in reducing arrears. From that basis FlexMyRent provides an alternative to credit use for residents to manage their incomes. Without it, they would have struggled.
There were significant benefits for people who used it for more than one year – cumulative in terms of the savings they got from the scheme compared to borrowing from lenders.
We still believe that, for some people, being able to use flexible payments is an alternative to credit use. People on low incomes welcome and appreciate it. It provides a way of communicating with their landlords that goes beyond the transactional and is beneficial for most of them.
The platform is also very cost effective – once up, the running costs are tiny. There are some hidden costs for Income Officers to assess decisions, but these should be contrasted with the costs of chasing arrears, uncertainty around cashflow and having greater insights into resident rent payment patterns. Ultimately, the pilot worked and succeeded in what it was trying to achieve – but it’s currently on ice. Southern have recently restructured and the earliest they can consider revisiting the scheme is next year.
M: What’s next?
D: Alongside the evaluation report, we have also conducted our own analysis of the approach taken to evaluate each FlexMyRent proposal. As part of this process, residents were asked questions about their financial circumstances. From our analysis, people were honest with their answers to these questions.
This has wider implications: if people will be honest about their financial pressures why do we need to gather and analyse so much data about their repayment histories etc? You also get much richer information when you ask people about their circumstances than you can reflect in a single ‘credit score’. The current ‘data-driven’ approach to credit scoring seems to ignore – or miss – a lot of important information about people.
There is also a bigger issue about the value of trust in credit relationships. I’m exploring this in detail for a new book, which Palgrave Macmillan have commissioned. Credit scoring surveillance systems are built on mistrust, and I think a lot of that back-fires in terms of the relationship that lenders have with their borrowers. If someone doesn’t trust you, it can affect how you behave towards them. There are wider implications, for example, in terms of how we construct social security systems. These also mistrust applicants and the level of bureaucracy and surveillance increases to address this: we can see this again now with Government’s proposed welfare reforms; the continued tightening of eligibility requirements, and imposition of greater conditionality for claimants. But this comes with huge administration costs and causes immense problems for the much larger proportion of genuine applicants who then fail to clear all the hurdles being put in their way. In my view, we need to find ways of encouraging and using trust to rebalance these systems.
For more information contact Matthew Grenier – matthew.grenier@hact.org.uk